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On the eve of the U.S. Senate primary, Colbath & Co. and the
Fourth DCA--repeating a tactic they had used on the eve of the
1996 general election-again kidnapped petitioner on void and
bogus legal process and sought to hold him through the election.
On and on it goes, an unprecedented attempt to prevent a citizen
from seeking office and exposing local and judicial corruption.
1
I. INTRODUCTION
Sounds like a scene out of a conspiracy theory novel, right? Guess
again. This paragraph was excerpted from a petition filed in the Supreme
Court of Florida in 1998. Colbath is Chief Judge Walter N. Colbath, Jr.,
1. Petition For Writ of Mandamus/Prohibition at 2, Martin v. Colbath (No. 94012),
consolidated into Martin v. State, 747 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 2000) (Nos. 93573 & 94012)
[hereinafter Martin Petition 1].
1
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who oversees the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida for Palm Beach
County, and who has been the target of numerous personal attacks in the
voluminous court filings of pro Se2 litigant Anthony R. Martin 3 in the
Fifteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, the
Supreme Court of Florida, and various federal courts. In the same petition in
which he leveled the above allegation,4 Martin went on to say about Palm
Beach County's Chief Judge: "Colbath is a pretty good politician, but not
much of a lawyer or judge. He should go back to law school."5 And in a
second petition filed in the Supreme Court of Florida that same year, Martin
directed insults at newly appointed Supreme Court Justice Barbara J.
Pariente, asserting that "Jewish judges are using their official positions to
pervert the law against petitioner," and that Jewish judges have retaliated
against him.
6
So what happened to Martin's petitions for relief?. In January 2000, the
Supreme Court of Florida denied them on the grounds that Martin's claims
were frivolous as well as abusive, and ordered that he could no longer file
anyyPro se petitions unless they were accompanied by the appropriate filing
fee. By reading Anthony Martin's numerous and repetitious petitions, one
learns that he is frustrated because he wins few of his cases, and that he
takes out his anger on all of those "who have unluckily crossed his path."s
2. When describing litigants, "pro se" litigant is defined as "[flor oneself; on one's
own behalf; without a lawyer." BLACK'S LAw DIcTIONARY 1236 (7th ed. 1999). One who
represents himself in court without counsel is a "pro se." Id. at 1237.
3. Anthony R. Martin is also known as Anthony R. Martin-Trigona. Martin v. State,
747 So. 2d 386, 387 (Fla. 2000).
4. The incident to which the petitioner Anthony Martin refers as his "kidnapping"
was actually an arrest in which the petitioner was denied bail. Response to Order to Show
Cause and Motion for Review by the Court En Bane at 3-4, Martin v. State, 747 So. 2d 386
(Fla. 2000) (Nos. 93573 & 94012) [hereinafter Martin Petition 2].
5. Martin Petition I at 6, (Nos. 93573 & 94012).
6. Verified Emergency Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 8, n.4, Martin v.
Beuttenmuller (No. 93573), consolidated into Martin v. State, 747 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 2000)
(Nos. 93573 & 94012) [hereinafter Martin Petition 3].
7. Martin, 747 So. 2d at 389-90, 392. Martin frequently files his petitions informa
pauperis so that he will not have to pay filing fees. Id. He is reportedly bankrupt. Id. at 387.
8. Id. at 391 (quoting In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1256 (2d Cir. 1984)). In
Martin-Trigona, the court described Martin as a person who considers himself to be the
victim of imaginary conspiracies. In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1257 (2d. Cir. 1984).
For example, the appendix to the opinion cites Martin's complaint in the United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut, which levels accusations that the "entire
bankruptcy court system in the entire United States is manipulated and controlled by Jewish
judges and Jewish lawyers" who have conspired to steal his property and violate his civil
rights by interfering with his right of access to courts. Id. at 1265-66. This footnote cannot
[Vol. 25:343
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He is one of Florida's most vexatious 9 litigants, and his hijinks, albeit
extreme as an example of courtroom frivolity, represent a growing issue that
Florida courts face as the number of pro se litigants entering the courtroom
rises.
Pro se litigants, with their limited knowledge of the law and oversight
of court rules, create serious problems for Florida courts and impose a heavy
burden upon courts' administration of justice in today's litigious society.
Those problems multiply when litigants become vexatious. The State of
Florida passed new legislation in June 2000 that will bring relief from the
barrage of frivolous lawsuits filed in Florida courts by vexatious pro se
litigants. 10 This article discusses how it will work, why it will work, and
what opposition it will face.
Part I will set the stage. It will identify the pro se litigant, and describe
what effects he or she has on Florida courts. It will also detail the current
sanctions available to punish pro se litigants who file frivolous actions and
will explain the drawbacks of those sanctions. Part II will discuss the
Florida Vexatious Litigant Law ("FVLL") in detail, including the
legislature's rationale for its passage and the methods used for labeling a
person as a "vexatious litigant." It will also explain the prohibitions placed
upon a vexatious litigant's case once he or she has been so labeled. In Part
I, the FVLL will be compared to current case law, and the author will
assert that the legislature merely codified into statute what courts have
already been haphazardly enforcing and will explain why the statute will
create a more efficient process for disposing of frivolous lawsuits. It will
also compare the Florida statute to similar vexatious litigant laws enacted in
other states.'1 Part IV will address the pro se litigant's arguments that the
statute violates the right of access to courts guaranteed by the Florida
Constitution1 and will assert that those arguments ultimately fail because
sufficient safeguards exist within the statute to limit the frivolous activity of
such litigants without infringing upon their constitutional rights. Finally,
convey the full extent of Martin's offensive and anti-semitic slurs and attacks. For a better
picture of Martin's offensiveness, a reading of the entire opinion is encouraged.
9. "Vexatious" is defined as being "without reasonable ... cause or excuse;
harassing; annoying." BLACK'S LAW DiCrIONARY 1559 (7th ed. 1999). A vexatious suit is
one that is "instituted maliciously and without good cause." Id.
10. FLA. STAT. § 68.093 (2000).
11. California enacted a vexatious litigant law in 1963. See CAL. CIV. P. CODE § 391
(West 1998 & Supp. 2000). Texas created a similar statute in 1997. See Tax. Civ. PRAc. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 11.001-.004 (West Supp. 2000). Hawaii and Ohio have enacted vexatious
litigant statutes as well. See Orno Rnv. CODE ANN. § 2323.52 (Anderson 1998); see also
HAW. REv. STAT. § 634J (1999).
12. FL. CONST. art. I, § 21.
2000]
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this article will conclude with a recap of why this law will help to unburden
the Florida court system.
II. THE PRO SE LITIGANT'S ABILITY TO BRING THE WHEELS OF
JUSTICE TO A HALT
To understand the problems that pro se litigants create for the judicial
system, it is necessary to understand who sues and what they allege.
Statistics on pro se litigants are sparse, but recent studies have shown that
not all pro se litigants are indigent, as was once commonly thought.13 About
twenty percent of pro se litigants say they can afford a lawyer but simply do
not want one.' 4 Individuals with incomes less than $50,000 are more likely
to represent themselves.' 5 In state court, pro se litigants may represent
themselves in various types of actions: divorce or family law proceedings,
contract actions, tort suits, or probate matters, just to name a few. At least
sixty-five percent of marriage dissolution cases in Florida involve at least
16one pro se litigant at some point during the case. Statistics on the number
of pro se filings for each are unfortunately not compiled, but as the courts of
Florida begin to study further the pro se litigant's needs for self-help
services,17 such statistics should become available.
Even judges at the federal court level 8 must contend with an increasing
percentage of cases filed pro se, most commonly by both prisoners and
individuals bringing employment discrimination suits under federal
statutes.19  In federal courts, pro se cases have increased steadily-from
13. NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, REPORT ON TRENDS IN TnE STATE COURTS, 1997-
1998 ED., at 47 [hereinafter TRENDS IN THE STATE COURTS]. The common misconception
about pro se litigants is that they cannot afford a lawyer, but in reality some just prefer to do it
themselves and may feel that they do not have any "resources or property to squabble about."
Jan Pudlow, Access to Justice Panel to Study Issue of Pro Se Litigants, FLA. BAR. NEWS, Jan.
1, 2000, at 11.
14. TRENDS IN THE STATE COURTS, supra note 13, at 47.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 50. See generally Jona Goldschmidt, How Are Courts Handling Pro Se
Litigants?, 82 JUDICATURE 13 (1998).
17. Pudlow, supra note 13, at 11.
18. Frivolous litigation in federal courts is an important issue as well, but because the
remedies for cure are different from those available in state courts, this note focuses only on
the effect of the FVLL on state courts. Including a detailed discussion on federal courts
would exceed the scope of this note.
19. Jerry Nagle, Pro Se Litigation and Its Impact on the Courts (Feb. 22, 1995), The
Information Service of the National Center for State Courts, available at
http:/www.ncsc.dni.us/is/MEMOS/S95-0724.htm.
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fifteen percent of total filings in 1991 to twenty-four percent in 1994.20 Most
cases filed by pro se prisoners are civil rights actions. Many pro se
litigants (especially prisoners) are illiterate and unschooled in the law, and a
good number are "frequent filers" who have more than twenty cases in court
at any given time.23
Pro se litigants increase case flow problems. Because courts are
aware that many pro se litigants are unfamiliar with both the legal system
and legal procedure, great consideration is given to them in terms of how
they are allowed to proceed with their cases. 24  Courts give them
considerable latitude in the tone and pace of the trial. Pro se litigants often
struggle with the completion of legal forms, as well as the process of filing
and serving court papers?2 In addition to the pro se litigant's frustration
with court rules, judges are also frustrated with having to continue cases or
deny motions without prejudice in order to give pro se litigants a fair day in
court.26 Judges are uncomfortable with the slow pace of pro se litigants'
cases in their courtrooms (which results from the litigants being untrained in
rules of evidence and procedure), as well as having to intervene to nudge
litigants along at times. 27 The court is faced with a difficult task when a
litigant represents him or herself, because the obligation to serve as an
impartial referee conflicts with the need to assist the pro se litigant in
procedural matters.?
A. Far Reaching Negative Effects of Frivolous Pro Se Litigation
One should not make the assumption that "every pro se litigant is
clueless."29 On the contrary, some pro se litigants are well versed in legal
20. Lurana S. Snow, Prisoners in the Federal Courts, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 295,296
(1997).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 301. The federal courts address the issue of frivolous and abusive lawsuits
under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11. There is no
requirement of overwhelming abuse, although courts do have the discretion to take into
account the circumstances of pro se litigants. Howard D. DuBosar & Ubaldo J. Perez, Jr.,
Comment, Ask Questions First and Shoot Later: Constraining Frivolity in Litigation Under
Rule 11, 40 U. MLANU L. REV. 1267, 1283 (1986).
23. TREDs iN THE STATE COURTS, supra note 13, at 49.
24. Nagle, supra note 19.
25. Jan Pudlow, Searching for Pro Se Solutions, FLA. BAR. NEws, June 15, 2000,
at1.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Goldschmidt, supra note 16, at 16.
29. Pudlow, supra note 25, at 1.
2000]
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terminology and capable of writing properly constructed motions.30 Many
pro se litigants make an honest effort to conduct themselves properly and
abide by the procedural rules.31 However, those few that use the judicial
system as a weapon to harass and intimidate others wreak havoc on the
32system and give the common pro se litigant a bad reputation.
A major problem with discussing the concept of frivolous pro se
litigation in detail is that it is difficult to define the extent of the problem.
Florida has recently addressed the needs of the pro se litigant in its
development of an Access to Justice Task Force,33 but no comprehensive
study on the extent of pro se litigation, or the level of frivolity caused by it,
has yet been completed.
Frivolous lawsuits by vexatious litigants cause delays in the legal
system, consume substantial amounts of scarce judicial resources, and
generate hours of work for court personnel because the litigants file
meaningless documents to provoke arguments with judges about previous
decisions.3 4 But the problem with frivolous lawsuits goes beyond the impact
on the court system. In one California case, a vexatious litigant's history of
filing frivolous suits with questionable merit actually depreciated the
property value of homes in her neighborhood because she was so fond of
suing her neighbors.3 5
Consequently, defendants named in frivolous actions are also impacted
by the increase in frivolous litigation. Defendants in frivolous suits have
36two options: defend the suit, or settle the case for a de minimis monetary
award.3 7 Both options are costly, since they require either that defendants
seek legal counsel to defend their rights, or that they settle and pay out
whatever sum will persuade the vexatious litigant to drop the lawsuit. Some
defendants prefer to settle in order to avoid the vexatious litigant's
harassment, but settling may actually create an incentive for a vexatious
litigant to file even more frivolous litigation.38
30. Id.
31. Biermann v. Cook, 619 So. 2d 1029, 1031 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
32. Lee W. Rawles, Note, The California Vexatious Litigant Statute: A Viable
Judicial Tool to Deny the Clever Obstructionists Access?, 72 S. CAL L. REV. 275, 278
(1998).
33. Pudlow, supra note 13, at 11.
34. Rawles, supra note 32, at 281.
35. Id. at 282.
36. "De minimis" means small or trifling. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 443 (7th ed.
1999).
37. Rawles, supra note 32, at 282.
38. Id. at 282-83.
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The overwhelming number of frivolous suits also contributes to the
public outrage at the judicial system in general. 39 Litigants with legitimate
legal matters are delayed or postponed while clerks and judges deal with the
frivolity and tying up of court resources by vexatious litigants. Vexatious
litigants manage to slow the judicial system as a whole and create discontent
and frustration for both the court administration and those litigants who
appear in the courtrooms.
B. Current Sanctions Available at the Court's Disposal
Courts currently use a variety of sanctions in their attempt to curb the
frivolous and harassing activity of vexatious pro se litigants. However, the
means of enforcing sanctions against litigants is not uniform, and different
courts at different points have been using different forms of punishment.
This lack of uniformity has created chaos in Florida courtrooms and clerks'
offices as personnel try to follow individualized decisions and orders for
each litigant.
For many pro se litigants, court proceedings begin with a4getition for
leave to file under indigent status, known as informa pauperis, by asking
the court to waive the costs of filing.4 1 By preparing an affidavit claiming
poverty and providing the details of one's financial condition, a pro se
litigant can have filing fees and court costs waived.42 This freedom to
litigate without concern for the costs means that pro se litigants have nothing
to lose (and everything to gain) by filing their lawsuits under indigent status.
Courts, however, have observed their vexatious litigation patterns and have
begun barring vexatious litigants from filing in forma pauperis (allowing
their lawsuits to be filed only if they provide the appropriate filing fees).43
39. Id. at 283.
40. "Informa pauperis" is defined as the manner in which an indigent is permitted to
disregard filing fees and court costs in litigation. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 783 (7th ed.
1999).
41. See FLA. STAT. § 57.081 (2000).
42. Id. Costs are waived only for the following services for persons filing in forma
pauperis: filing fees, service of process, certified copies of orders and final judgments, single
copies of court pleadings and documents, examining fees, mediation services, subpoena
services, collection charges, and costs of transcripts and exhibits for appeals. Id.
43. See, e.g., Martin v. State, 747 So. 2d 386 (2000). In Martin, the supreme court
criticized Anthony Martin, one of Florida's most vexatious litigants, who has filed over 30
petitions in the Supreme Court of Florida alone. Id. at 388. The supreme court issued an
order imposing sanctions that barred him from filing any future petitions in its court without
the proper filing fee. Id. at 387. In doing so, the court was using its authority to deny
indigent status (regardless of actual financial position) in situations when the litigant is
2000]
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A court can also sanction a vexatious litigant by prohibiting court
filings that do not contain the signature of a member of the state bar
association.44 Litigants have a guaranteed right of access to the courts,45 and
while courts have given much leeway in the pleadings and other motions
filed by pro se litigants, 46 they have also recognized that when litigants
abuse the court's latitude, sanctions requiring the assistance of counsel are
warranted.47 In Gladstone v. Smith,4 Florida's Fourth District Court of
Appeal affirmed an order that required a pro se litigant to appear through an
attorney if he wanted to refile his lawsuit after dismissal when the litigant
had amended one complaint ten times.49 The court held that a pro se litigant
should not be held to a lesser standard than that of a reasonably competent
attorney, applying the rationale that if the standards for pro se litigants are
lowered, increased frivolous litigation would result.5° In the interest of
preventing pro se litigants from endlessly tying up judicial resources with
frivolous matters, Florida courts frequently issue orders prohibiting
particularly vexatious litigants who refuse to obtain the assistance of counsel
from filing on their own if assistance is clearly warranted by the deficiencies
in the litigant's court pleadings.51
Courts can also strike or dismiss pleadings when they are patently
frivolous. 52  A common problem with pro se litigants is that they lack
sufficient legal knowledge of proper causes of action and often write
pleadings so deficient that the courts have no choice but to strike them
down. In Hammond v. A. Vetsburg Co.,53 the Supreme Court of Florida held
abusive and the sanction will prevent future frivolous petitions. Id.; see Martin v. Marko, 651
So. 2d 819 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
Similar sanctions are also available in the federal courts. See, e.g., In re McDonald, 489
U.S. 180 (1989) (holding that a petitioner who continually submitted frivolous requests for
writs was not allowed to file any further actions to the Court informa pauperis).
44. Attwood v. Eighth Cir. Ct., Union County, 667 So. 2d 356, 357 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1995).
45. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
46. See, e.g., Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (holding that allegations in pro
se complaints should be held to less stringent standards than pleadings drafted by counsel).
47. See, e.g., Atwood, 667 So. 2d at 356.
48. 729 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
49. i at 1003.
50. Id. at 1004.
51. See, e.g., Emery v. Clifford, 721 So. 2d 401, 402 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
(holding that an order requiring litigant to obtain counsel was proper given her vexatious
pleadings); Platel v. Maguire, Voorhis & Wells, P.A., 436 So. 2d 303, 304 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1983) (finding that a litigant who upsets the administration of justice to the point that it
interferes with others should be restrained by requiring an attorney's signature on pleadings).
52. 10 FLA. JuR. 2D Pleadings § 183 (1982).
53. 48 So. 419 (Fla. 1908).
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that when a plea is so plainly frivolous, even though it may conform to the
rules of pleading, it may be stricken by motion if the subject matter is
absolutely without merit. A "frivolous plea" was later defined in Rhea v.
Hackney5 as one which may be true in fact but sets up no defense (or by
extension, no cause of action).56
A different situation arises when the pleadings prepared by litigants are
clearly false in fact or based on incorrect details. When a plea is absolutely
false in fact, it is called a "sham plea" and can be stricken in the same
manner.5 7 In DiGiovanni v. All-Pro Golf, Inc.,58 Florida's Second District
Court of Appeal held that a motion to dismiss a pleading as sham was only
to be granted when there was an absence of issues of material fact and a
pleading sound on the surface but instituted in bad faith.5 9 For example,
Anthony Martin, discussed earlier, often misunderstands and misrepresents
the facts of the situations he contests in his petitions and files motions with
the clear intention to harass those with whom he deals in the court system.
His petitions would likely come close to being outright "shams" and should
be stricken or dismissed by the courts. However, this remedy is available
only after a complaint has been filed in the court system; thus courts are still
burdened with frivolous or sham lawsuits until the defendants in those
lawsuits move to strike pleadings.
Finally, the courts in Florida have the statutory authority to award
monetary sanctions for the costs of litigation to a prevailing party when there
is a finding that an action is based on a complete absence of "a justiciable
issue of either law or fact." The Second District Court of Appeal upheld a
sanction awarding attorneys' fees in Biermann v. Cook,61 where a litigant
representing himself filed numerous inappropriate and unorthodox pleadings
on appeal that had no justiciable issues of law or fact.62 The Biermann court
stated that "[n]o court is obligated to permit a litigant 'to take advantage of
the court as the forum to express his personal criticism and castigation not
54. Id. at 420.
55. 157 So. 190 (Fla. 1934).
56. Id. at 194.
57. Id.
58. 332 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
59. Id. at 93. The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure provide a remedy for striking
"sham pleadings." FIA. R. Cv. P. 1.150(a). A party can dismiss all or part of a pleading that
is false in fact by verified motion at any time before trial. Id.; see Decker v. County of
Volusia, 698 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 5th Dist. CL App. 1997).
60. Biermarm v. Cook, 619 So. 2d 1029, 1030 (Fla. 2d Dist Ct. App. 1993)
(explaining FIA. STAT. § 57.105 (1999)).
61. Id. at 1029.
62. Id. at 1030.
20001
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only of his adversary but of opposing counsel, court staff, and judiciary."' 63
Similarly, in Parker v. Parker,64 the Fourth District Court of Appeal held
that an award of sanctions prescribed by Florida statute was appropriate
where a litigant filed a frivolous motion asking the court to set aside a
supposedly fraudulent judgment issued years before.65
The problem with all of the above described sanctions is that they are
not applied universally by the different courts in Florida. A pro se litigant
can file his or her frivolous complaints under indigent status in a local circuit
court until the court issues an order barring his or her indigent status, at
which time the litigant simply moves on to the next higher court, or to a
neighboring circuit court, and does the same thing.66 When a vexatious
litigant fails to obtain indigent status in any Florida court but manages to
scrape together the appropriate filing fees, the litigant again has free reign to
wreak havoc on the court system with vexatious lawsuits. This pattern
continues until a court dismisses the suits as frivolous or shams, and issues
an order forcina the losing litigant to pay the defendants' court costs and
attorneys' fees. Waiting for either of these occurrences can mean that a
great deal of a court's time, as well as a defendant's time, is wasted. In fact,
it may be futile to pursue any award for attorneys' fees under section 57.105
of the Florida Statutes, since many pro se litigants are indigent and
judgment proof, being without the resources to pay any awards.-
For all of these reasons, a mechanism for more uniformly and com-
pletely limiting the intrusion of frivolous lawsuits into Florida courtrooms
was demanded. The Florida legislature responded with the FVLL.69
63. Id. (quoting Continental Nat'l Am. Group v. Majeske, 305 A.2d 291, 292 (D.
Conn. 1973)).
64. 585 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
65. Id. at 329.
66. Pro se litigants often possess the misconception that they are entitled to litigate
their claims in any Florida court regardless of the outcome at the initial trial court. Often they
file appeals to the district courts of appeal or to the Supreme Court of Florida and attempt to
frame previously litigated claims that should be procedurally barred (by the doctrine of res
judicata) as new ones. However, the Supreme Court of Florida determined that the district
courts now constitute the "courts of last resort" for most litigants. Rivera v. State, 728 So. 2d
1165, 1166 (Fla. 1998) (citing In re Amendments to Fla. R. App. P., 609 So. 2d 516, 526
(Fla. 1992)).
67. FLA. STAT. § 57.105 (2000).
68. See Kreager v. Glickman, 519 So. 2d 666, 667 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988)
(discussing a vexatious pro se litigant who had a one and a half million dollar judgment
entered against him that utterly failed to deter him from his malicious court filings). The
implication here is that sanctions under section 57.105 of the Florida Statutes would not stop
a litigant from future filings when the litigant evidences neither any means nor any desire to
fulfill another court obligation.
69. FLA. STAT. § 68.093 (2000).
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III. THE LEGISLATURE'S SOLUTION TO FRIVOLOUS PRO SE LITIGATION
The legislature has long recognized a need to curb the number of
frivolous lawsuits being filed within state courts. As early as 1978, the
legislature enacted the statutory provision that awarded costs of litigation to
the prevailing party when the action was determined to have been devoid of
merit at commencement. 7° However, this statute has proven ineffective
against indigent pro se litigants for reasons previously discussed.
Recognizing that prisoners initiated a great number of frivolous pro se suits,
the legislature again tried to crack down on frivolous pro se litigation in
1996 when it passed legislation that sought to limit the ability of prisoners to
file numerous lawsuits under indigent status. 71 With strong conviction about
the issue, the legislature prefaced the statute with the following language:
"under current law frivolous inmate lawsuits are dismissible by the courts
only after considerable expenditure of precious taxpayer and judicial
resources. ' '72 In the introduction to the new statutes created by the bill, the
legislature said, in part, "state and local governments spend millions of
dollars each year processing, serving, and defending frivolous lawsuits filed
by self-represented indigent inmates, and... the overwhelming majority of
civil lawsuits filed by self-represented indigent inmates are frivolous and
malicious actions intended to embarrass or harass public officers and
employees. ' 73 The problem is that the legislation impacts only prisoner
litigants, so the impact from private citizens filing pro se is still staggering.
So while the legislature has taken at least two statutory steps to reduce
frivolous litigation, a renewed acknowledgment of the need for sanctions
again arose, pushing for action to curtail the number of frivolous lawsuits
filed by vexatious pro se litigants on a broad scope. The business law
section of the Florida Bar perceived the need for a device that would restrict
the frivolous activity of p4ro se litigants in Florida courts, and proposed the
FVLL to the legislature. The bill's sponsor in the Senate noted that the
law would not affect people who are trying to resolve legitimate disputes;
70. Ch. 78-275, § 1, 1978 Fla. Laws 791, 792 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 57.105
(2000)).
71. Ch. 96-106, § 1, 1996 Fla. Laws 92, 92-3 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 57.081,
.085, 92.351, 95.11, 944.279, & 944.28 (2000)). This legislation required greater proof of
poverty from inmates who were requesting indigent status in the courts, allowed the courts to
dismiss a prisoner's lawsuit when it appeared groundless, and allowed the forfeiture of gain
time as a penalty for filing frivolous actions. Id. at § 1(1), 1996 Fla. Laws at 93.
72. Id. at 93.
73. Id. at 92.
74. Audio tape: Florida Vexatious Litigant Law: Hearing on H. 0557 Before the
House of Representatives Comm. on Judiciary, 102d Legis., Interim Comm. Meeting, (Feb. 7,
2000) [hereinafter Audio Tape] (statement ofRep. J. Dudley Goadlette, sponsor).
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rather the law is aimed at those individuals with a propensity for filing
harassing civil actions.75
The first task the legislature faced in passing the FVLL was
determining at what point a pro se litigant was so bothersome as to be
labeled vexatious. There was much debate in the House of Representatives
Judiciary Committee over where to draw this line.76 The bill signed by
Governor Jeb Bush on June 19, 2000 defined a "vexatious litigant" as "[a]
person77... who, in the immediately preceding 5-year period, has
commenced, prosecuted, or maintained, pro se, five or more civil actions in
any court in this state.., which actions have been finally and adversely
determined against such person. 78  Once a person has been labeled a
vexatious litigant pursuant to the above definition, he or she retains the
classification indefinitely.79
A. Becoming a Vexatious Litigant
So how does a litigant become a vexatious litigant? The process used
to classify a litigant as vexatious depends on whether the litigant has an
action pending in court at the time. If an action is already pending, a
defendant can move for a hearing and ask the court to enter an order that the
pro se plaintiff furnish a security bond in the amount of the defendant's
reasonably anticipated court costs and attorneys' fees on the grounds that the
plaintiff is a vexatious litigant whose lawsuit is frivolous. The hearing
gives both parties the opportunity to present evidence relevant to the
75. Bill Would Limit Frivolous Suits, FLA. BAR. NEWS, Nov. 15, 1999, at 14.
76. Audio Tape, supra note 74 (statements of Rep. J. Dudley Goodlette and other
committee members).
77. A "person" under section 1.01(3) of the Florida Statutes includes, but is not
limited to, any individual, firm, association, partnership, estate, corporation, or group. FLA.
STAT. § 1.01(3) (2000). Thus, a pro se litigant suing in the name of his business or
corporation would still fall within the confines of the FVLL.
78. § 68.093(2)(d)(1). The terminology "finally and adversely determined against
such person" receives little explanation in the legislature's bill. See id. The statute defines an
action to be "finally and adversely determined" if no appeal in the action is pending.
§ 68.093(2)(d)(2). However, questions remain regarding what an adverse determination is
and it is unclear whether actions which are settled out of court, removed to a different court,
or dismissed voluntarily by the litigant are adverse determinations.
79. Id. The wording "[a]ny person or entity previously found to be a vexatious
litigant pursuant to this section," referring to section 68.093(2)(d)(1), leaves open the
possibility that even if a pro se litigant has not within the preceding five years received five
adverse judgments, if he or she has ever been deemed by Florida courts to be a vexatious
litigant, the restrictions would continue indefinitely. Id. The statute does not provide any
method for pro se litigants to be removed from the courts' registry of vexatious litigants.
80. FLA. STAT. § 68.093(3)(a)-(b) (2000).
[Vol. 25:343
12
Nova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 10
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol25/iss1/10
Neveils
determination of the plaintiff's likelihood of succeeding with his or her
claim.81 In order to have the motion granted, the defendant can provide
documentation that the pro se plaintiff meets the statutory requirements in
having received five adverse judgments in five years, show that the plaintiff
is not likely to prevail on the merits of his or her case, and then ask the court
to classify the plaintiff as a vexatious litigant, requiring the litigant to
furnish a security bond for the anticipated court costs and attorneys' fees.
8 2
Additionally, even if a vexatious litigant does not currently have an
action pending, a court may, either on its own motion or on the motion of
any party, enter a prefiling order that bars the vexatious litigant from filing
any further pro se lawsuits in the courts of that circuit unless he obtains
leave from the administrative judge.83 If a pro se litigant makes a request,
the administrative judge may grant leave to file a meritorious action, if it is
determined at a hearing that the action is not filed for the purpose of
harassment or delay.84 The judge, if he or she chooses, can also still require
the posting of the security bond previously discussed as a condition to be
met before filing any such action.
B. The Effects of Being Labeled a Vexatious Litigant
Once a pro se plaintiff has been registered as vexatious, several things
happen. If there is a pending action in one of the applicable courts and the
judge determines that the plaintiff is not likely to win on the merits of his
case, that plaintiff must furnish a security bond for the defendant's court
86
costs and attorneys' fees. If the plaintiff fails to post this bond, the courtthen dismisses the action with prejudice.8 7
81. Id.
82. § 68.093(3)(b).
83. § 68.093(4).
84. Id.
85. FLA. STAT. § 68.093(4) (2000).
86. § 68.093(3)(a). According to the Florida House of Representatives Committee on
the Judiciary, the plaintiff would presumably post bond with the court as done with replevin
actions; however, the Committee noted that the statute as drafted required the plaintiff to
furnish the bond directly to the moving defendant rather than placing it in the court's trust,
and provided no means of return of the bond to the plaintiff should he prevail. STAFF OF
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF HB (FLORDA VEXATIOUS
LITIGANT LAw) 8 (Fla. 2000) 557 [hereinafter ANALYSIS OF HB 557]. An amendment to the
House Bill was proposed, but the changed language did not ultimately become part of the
final bill approved by Governor Bush because the House version of the bill died on the floor.
Compare House of Representatives Committee on Judiciary, Amendment No. 01 to H. 557,
(Feb. 8, 2000) available at http:lwww.leg.state.fl.uslcitizenldocumentslstatutesl1998/ with
Florida Vexatious Litigant Law, FLA. STAT. § 68.093(3)(b) (2000). This could prove
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If the court has issued a prefiling order that requires the pro se plaintiff
to obtain leave of the court to file an action, the clerk of the court is under
order not to file any actions from vexatious litigants absent that court's
permission. 88 If the vexatious litigant violates this order and attempts to file
an action anyway, his or her disobedience can be punished as contempt of
court.89 Furthermore, the relief provided by the FVLL is cumulative to ana
other relief currently provided by section 57.105 of the Florida Statutes.
Thus, even if a suit is dismissed for failure to post the required security
bond, monetary sanctions for filing a frivolous lawsuit and causing a
defendant to incur needless litigation expenses up to that point can still be
assessed against a vexatious pro se litigant. Finally, the clerk of the court
must maintain copies of all prefiling orders issued by the court, and must
also forward copies of all prefiling orders to the Supreme Court of Florida,
which will maintain a registry of vexatious litigants for central reference.92
IV. THE VEXATIOUS LITIGANT LAW AS A NOT-SO-NOVEL APPROACH
The FVLL simply codifies the sanctions that the courts have already
been using haphazardly. As previously discussed, courts have applied
sanctions such as denying indigent status, requiring counsel in order to file a
complaint, dismissing frivolous or sham pleadings, and awarding monetary
damages for pursuing frivolous causes of action for years. However, until
now there have been no guidelines that tell the courts when to enforce each
particular sanction. Decisions to sanction have been made individually by
each court. Consequently, the same litigant who is barred from filing in
problematic for courts until a method for handling the posting of a security bond is
established.
87. FLA. STAT. § 68.093(3)(b)-(c) (2000).
88. Article V of the Florida Constitution describes how the supreme court and the
district courts of appeal appoint a clerk, who is charged with "perform[ing] such duties as the
court directs." FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3, cl. c & § 4, cl. c. Thus, if a judge or justice orders a
clerk not to accept filings without the appropriate fees, a clerk must follow that order.
ANALYSiS oF HB 557, supra note 86.
If a court clerk files an action instigated by a registered vexatious litigant by mistake,
any party to the action can file a notice with the court stating that the plaintiff is a pro se
vexatious litigant subject to a prefiling order. FLA. STAT. § 68.093(5) (2000). This filed
notice stays the litigation process, and unless the pro se plaintiff moves for leave to file the
action, the judge can dismiss his action with prejudice 10 days after the notice is filed. Id.
89. § 68.093(4).
90. § 57.105.
91. § 68.093. However, as previously discussed, most pro se litigants are judgment
proof, so attempts to collect these monetary sanctions may prove to be fruitless.
92. § 68.093(6).
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forma pauperis in one court after filing five unsuccessful lawsuits can
sometimes still walk into another court and continue filing and harassing his
or her targets time and time again. The FVLL draws a line for the courts,
giving them a guide for when to say that a vexatious litigant has crossed the
line into being abusive of the judicial system.
A. Reducing Frivolous Litigation More Efficiently
The FVLL combines several of the currently used sanctions and simply
prescribes an efficient manner for enforcing them. This law sets at five the
number of cases in which a pro se litigant must receive an adverse judgment
and tells the court that a litigant is becoming abusive of the court system at
that point.93 In the past, litigants have sometimes been allowed to file up to
forty petitions before courts ended their abusive behavior by refusing to
allow further complaints to be filed.94 Thus, one of the ways that the FVLL
makes the process more effective is by allowing a judge to say that a
vexatious litigant has caused enough trouble at a much earlier point in his or
her dealings with the court.
A second advantage to this law is that it provides a mechanism whereby
a frivolous cause of action can be dismissed with prejudice9 s early in
litigation.96 If motions to strike frivolous and sham pleadings are granted, a
court still has the option of giving the party an oportunity to amend or
submit additional pleadings to correct the errors. Because the FVLL
requires an order of dismissal with prejudice if a party does not furnish the
required bond, it does not leave courts with the latitude to allow
amendments. 98 Thus, another benefit of the FVLL is that it allows a court to
enter a final judgment against frivolous claims early on in the litigation
93. § 68.093(2)(d)(1).
94. See generally Martin v. State, 747 So. 2d 386, 387-88 (Fla. 2000) (recognizing
that petitioner had filed 43 petitions to the Fourth District Court of Appeal, and 30 petitions to
the Supreme Court of Florida); Rivera v. State, 728 So. 2d 1165, 1165 (Fla. 1998) (noting that
petitioner had filed at least 20 petitions to its court alone); Attwood v. Eighth Cir. CL, Union
County, 667 So. 2d 356, 356 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that litigant had filed 17
appeals or petitions in its court, most of which received adverse judgments); Platel v.
Maguire, Voorhis, & Wells, P.A., 436 So. 2d 303, 304 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
(commenting that petitioner had filed nine notices of appeal in 14 months).
95. A dismissal with prejudice means that a lawsuit cannot be amended and refiled.
BLACK'S LAW DiCTIONARY 482 (7th ed. 1999).
96. FLA. STAT. § 68.093(2)(d)(1) (2000).
97. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.150(a).
98. § 68.093(3)(c); see also Gladstone v. Smith, 729 So. 2d 1002, 1003 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1999) (noting that petitioner had been allowed to amend his initial complaint 10
times before he was ordered to obtain counsel to proceed with the litigation).
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process, rather than having to allow repeated amendments that further tie up
court resources.
The FVLL does not outright require a litigant to obtain counsel in order
to continue filing complaints. However, the FVLL only applies to actions
filed pro se. This means that once litigants have been prohibited from
further pro se filings, if they present valid complaints and have attorneys
sign those complaints, they will not face barriers to getting those complaints
filed and starting the litigation process. The rationale behind having
attorneys sign the filings presented to the court is to ensure that filings are
legally sound and properly drafted. 99 The law is written only to prevent
those litigants from filing suits that no lawyer would sign their names to in
good conscience. Legitimate complaints which are recognized and accepted
by counsel, as well as those filed pro se that express legitimate claims, will
not be barred by this law.
The obvious advantage of the FVLL over the current monetary
sanctions under section 57.105 of the Florida Statutes is that costs of
litigation are addressed at earlier stages of litigation. Section 57.105
sanctions require that one party must prevail, meaning that in most cases
there has to be a final judgment.'0° At that point, a vexatious litigant has
possibly harassed and abused the defendants, witnesses, and judicial staff for
years. Additionally, the litigant likely will not possess the resources to pay
any judgment of attorneys' fees, and he or she is unlikely to have learned the
intended lesson that filing frivolous suits is wrong. Since the intent of
frivolous suits is to harass, once a litigant has seen a lawsuit through to
completion, even if it results in an adverse judgment, the objective has been
successfully completed. With pro se litigants, the monetary sanctions under
section 57.105 do not have the deterrent effect that was intended.
In contrast, the FVLL requires that a vexatious litigant post a bond in
order to proceed with his or her frivolous lawsuit.10' In forcing this action,
the courts are guaranteeing that a defendant who is hauled into court is
protected to some degree from bearing the costs of litigation. By raising the
issue of costs of litigation early in the process, the court forces the vexatious
pro se litigant to examine the claims made and to determine whether claims
are important enough to proceed. This law ensures that a defendant will not
waste countless days and precious monetary resources on litigation, only to
learn at the end of the road that he or she will not be reimbursed for his or
her troubles. For these reasons the FVLL will prove to be more effective
99. McAliley v. McAliley, 704 So. 2d 611, 614 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997)
(Farmer, J., concurring).
100. FLA. STAT. § 57.105(1) (2000). The award for attorneys' fees is ordered at the
end of litigation. See id.
101. § 68.093(3)(b).
[Vol. 25:343
16
Nova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 10
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol25/iss1/10
Neveils
than sanctions currently in place, and the courts should expect to see a more
effective process for reducing the burden of frivolous lawsuits.
B. Following the Trend in Other States
Four other states have also introduced similar statutes into their
courts. 1°2 California's statute is the most similar to the FVLL. Indeed, the
California Vexatious Litigant Statute was the model upon which Florida's
law was based. 0 3 Most of the other states' laws use essentially the same
language, with the exception of the Ohio Vexatious Litigator Statute.04 All
except Ohio's specify a certain number of cases in which a litigant must
receive an adverse judgment in order to qualify for categorization as a
vexatious litigant.10 5 However, the statutory period differs from that chosen
by Florida's legislature. In California, Hawaii, and Texas, a litigant is
vexatious after he or she has received five or more adverse judgments in a
seven-year period, as opposed to afive-year period stated in Florida's law. 10 6
This means that Florida's law is slightly more restrictive than those of other
states.
A second distinction between the Florida law and others is that the
others (except Ohio's) define litigation as any civil action in either state or
federal court.1 7  Ohio's law applies only to state courts." Although
Florida's law is silent on whether it applies to federal courts, a plain reading
of the statute defining an "action" as one in a court governed by the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure (or the Florida Probate Rules) seems to imply that
federal courts in Florida do not benefit from the law's restrictions. One
possible effect of this omission is that vexatious litigants who have been
102. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. P. CODE § 391 (West 1998 & Supp. 2000); OHio REv. CODE
ANN. § 2323.52 (Anderson 1998); HAW. REV. STAT. § 634J (1999); Tax. Crv. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 11.001-.104 (West Supp. 2000).
103. Audio Tape, supra note 74.
104. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2323.52 (Anderson 1998).
105. CAL. Crv. P. CODE § 391(b)(1) (West 1998 & Supp. 2000); HAw. REv. STAT.
§ 634J-1(1) (1999); TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 11.054(1) (West Supp. 2000).
Ohio does not require a litigant to receive adverse judgments in a specific number of cases
within a chosen time frame. Instead, the state classifies a vexatious litigant as one who has
'"abitually, persistently, and without reasonable grounds engaged in vexatious conduct."
OrHO REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.52(A)(3) (Anderson 1998).
106. CAL. CIV. P. CODE § 391(b)(1) (West 1998 & Supp. 2000); HAW. REv. STAT.
§ 634.-1(1) (1999); TEX Cirv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 11.054(1) (West Supp. 2000).
107. CAL. Civ. P. CODE § 391(a) (West 1998 & Supp. 2000); HAw. REv. STAT.
§ 634J-1 (1999); TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 11.001(2) (West Supp. 2000).
108. OmOREv. CoDEANN. § 2323.52(A)(3) (Anderson 1998).
109. FLA. STAT.. § 68.093(2)(a) (2000).
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prohibited from filing in state courts might begin filing in federal courts,
thereby increasing the strain of frivolous litigation on the federal courts. One
way to correct this would be for the United States District Courts located in
Florida to issue a local rule stating that judges may refer to the FVLL for the
purpose of issuing sanctions against vexatious parties." 0
There are other minor differences between the FVLL and the vexatious
litigant laws in other states. For example, Texas' law gives a party just
ninety days from the date the answer was filed to make a motion for the
plaintiff to furnish a security bond."' Conversely, Florida's law is silent
regarding the timing of filing such a motion, but without such restrictions as
Texas places on bringing the motion, it seems a party has until the entry of
final judgment to ask for a bond to be furnished.1
Finally, the only other notable difference between the FVLL and other
states' vexatious litigant laws is the inclusion of additional definitions of a
"vexatious litigant" in California, Hawaii, and Texas. All three state statutes
include provisions that allow litigants to be termed vexatious if they allow
lawsuits to remain pending for at least two years with no trial date (in
addition to being termed vexatious because of adverse judgments).1 3 In all
three states, litigants can also earn the vexatious label by repeatedly
relitigating issues already finally determined in previous actions, and
repeatedly filing meritless motions, pleadings, or other papers to delay or
harass the other party." 4 In contrast, Florida's law does not provide such
mechanisms for terming parties to be vexatious; rather, Rarties only earn the
title if they receive five adverse judgments in five years.
Overall, in comparison to other vexatious litigant laws, the FVLL is
somewhat less broad. Florida frames the definition of a vexatious litigant
more narrowly and allows the statute to affect only certain courts within the
state. The FVLL applies only to actions governed by the Florida Rules of
110. See Rawles, supra note 32, at 288, n.80 (describing how California handled this
issue before the statute was amended to include federal courts in the state).
111. TEx. Crv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 11.051 (West Supp. 2000). California and
Hawaii allow such a motion until a final judgment has been entered. CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE
§ 391.1 (West 1998 & Supp. 2000); HAW. REV. STAT. § 634-2 (1999). Ohio does not
provide a mechanism by which a party can move the court to order the plaintiff to furnish a
security bond. See Ofio REv. CODE ANN. § 2323.52(A)(3) (Anderson 1998).
112. See FLA. STAT. § 68.093(3)(a) (2000).
113. TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 11.054(1)(B) (West Supp. 2000); CAL.
CIV. P. CODE § 391(b)(1)(ii) (West 1998 & Supp. 2000); HAw. REv. STAT. § 634J-1(1)(B)
(1999).
114. TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REm. CODE ANN. § 11.054(2)(A)-(B) (West Supp. 2000);
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 391(b)(2) (West 1998 & Supp. 2000); HAw. REv. STAT. § 634J-
1(2)-(3) (1999).
115. FLA. STAT. § 68.093(2)(d) (2000).
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Civil Procedure and the Florida Probate Rules, as well as actions governed
by the Florida Small Claims Rules.'16 It specifically excludes any actions in
courts governed by the Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure, meaning
that pro se actions for divorce, child custody, or other family law matters
would not be restrained.117 It likewise does not apply to criminal actions, or
to petitions for writs of habeas corpus.118 This is a departure from the
vexatious litigant laws enacted in the other states, in which actions in family
courts and writs of habeas corpus can apparently be subjected to the
restrictions of the vexatious litigant statutes.119 Florida's law declines to
encompass all of the definitions of a "vexatious litigant" that its counterparts
in other states do. Due to its narrower construction, the Florida law is likely
to affect only the most vexatious of litigants, and should draw less criticism
from pro se litigants claiming that it impinges on constitutional rights of
access to courts.
V. CLOSING THE COURTROOM DOORS TO FRIVOLOUS LITIGATION
Initial responses to the FVLL will consist of claims of constitutional
violations of a right of access to the courts. The Florida Constitution states,
116. § 68.093(2)(a), (3)(a).
117. Id.; STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, 102D CONG., ANALYSIS AND
ECONOMIC IMPACr STATEMENT ON CSISB 154 (VEXATIous LXnGANTs) 4 (Fla. 2000); see also,
Audio Tape, supra note 74. The statute is also silent as to whether the law applies to federal
courts within the state. See § 68.093(2)(a), (3)(a). Obviously, Florida legislatures have no
authority over federal courts, so this may be the reason for the omission. However, the
inclusion of federal court adverse judgments against a pro se litigant was mentioned at the
House of Representatives Committee on Judiciary's Hearing, and the Committee seemed
favorable to including those decisions when tallying the five adverse judgments. Audio Tape,
supra note 74. This is an important point to note because many pro se litigants file federal
civil rights violations suits as a blanket basis for their alleged harms after they fail to gain
relief in state courts.
Adverse judgments for actions in courts governed by the Florida Small Claims Rules
are not tallied for the purposes of establishing the threshold number to meet the statute's
requirements for terming a party a vexatious litigant. So while a pro se litigant's adverse
judgment in a small claims court is not held against him for purposes of totaling up the
number of adverse judgments, if he otherwise meets the criteria, he can be restrained from
filing lawsuits in small claims court under the statute's language. § 68.093(2)(d)(1).
118. Audio Tape, supra note 74.
119. The vexatious litigant statutes in California, Hawaii, and Texas place no
restrictions on the courts in which a vexatious litigant's activities can be restricted. CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE § 391 (West 1998 & Supp. 2000); HAw. Ray. STAT. § 634J-1 (1999); TaX. Cirv.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 11.001 (West Supp. 2000). Ohio's statute applies only to the
actions governed by the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure. OHIo Rav. CODE ANN. § 2323.52(C)
(Anderson 1998).
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in pertinent part, that "[t]he courts shall be open to every person for redress
of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or
delay., 12 Traditionally, courts have liberally construed the right of access
to guarantee everyone the opportunity to have their day in court.121 However,
courts have a responsibility to see that limited resources are allocated in a
way that "promotes the interests of justice."' They recognize a need to
reserve the resources of the court system for genuine dispute resolutions.
123
When one person's vexatious and harassing activities upset normal court
procedure, it becomes necessary to invoke some sort of restraint.'2 Courts
have recognized a legislative right to restrict access in certain circumstances
if a reasonable alternative remedy is shown.125 If there is no alternative
remedy, there must be an overpowering public necessity for the abolishment
of the right of access.'2
A pro se litigant who feels that his or her rights have been abused may
assert arguments that the constitutional right of access to courts restricts the
placing of financial barriers to bringing claims or defenses to court. 27 In
Don's Sod Co. v. Department of Revenue, 128 the Fifth District Court of
Appeal held that "[n]o bond requirement... can be employed by the
Legislature to prevent a constitutional challenge to those very provisions."' 29
This statement is problematic because some pro se litigants will construe it
to mean that absolutely no bond requirement can be enacted by the
legislature. However, what the holding actually suggests is that if a litigant
wants to challenge a bond requirement (or other restriction) on his or her
right of access to courts, the litigant cannot be barred from doing so by the
bond requirement. It says nothing about the constitutionality of a bond itself.
Another likely argument is found in Psychiatric Associates v. Siegel,130
where the Supreme Court of Florida explained that a statute requiring that a
bond for attorneys' fees be posted as a condition for bringing an action
violates the right of access to courts guaranteed by the Florida
Constitution. As a blanket statement, this is simply not true.
120. FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 21.
121. Psychiatric Assocs. v. Siegel, 610 So. 2d 419, 424 (Fla. 1992).
122. In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184 (1989).
123. Rivera v. State, 728 So. 2d 1165, 1166 (Fla. 1998).
124. Shotkdn v. Cohen, 163 So. 2d 330, 332 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
125. Siegel, 610 So. 2d at 424.
126. Id.
127. 10 FLA. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 316 (1997).
128. 661 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
129. Id. at 898.
130. 610So. 2d419 (FIa. 1992).
131. Id. at424-25.
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While access to courts must not be unreasonably burdened, requiring a
bond as a condition of bringing an action under some circumstances does not
violate the right of access to the courts.1 32 Courts recognize a public need to
impose a significant restraint on those who abuse the judicial system.133
However, courts must be careful that when limiting one's right of access to
the courts, they safeguard those rights to essential due process. 13 A restraint
on a right of access to courts should not amount to a total denial of access.
135
Issues of due process arise when the right of access to courts is
restricted as mandated by the FVLL. According to the Supreme Court of
Florida in Siegel, the test used to determine whether a statute violates the
due process clause is whether the statute "'bears a reasonable relation to a
permissible legislative objective and is not discriminatory, arbitrary or
oppressive.," 13  In Siegel, a bond requirement for bringing actions
challenging medical peer review board decisions was found to be
unconstitutional because it did not reasonably relate to the goal of reducing
frivolous suits by physicians, since the bond requirement was required of all
plaintiffs before filing, regardless of the merits of the case. 137 This statute
discriminated against those who could not afford to post a bond.138 A denial
of due process does not occur when a state restricts the right of access to
courts by means of a reasonable procedural requirement. 13  For example,
when courts afford a litigant a reasonable opportunity to be heard (i.e.,
evaluating the likelihood of the plaintiff's success) prior to requiring a
posting of a security bond, due process rights are not violated.
The California Vexatious Litigant Law was challenged in Taliaferro v.
Hoogs, 4° in which a pro se litigant disputed the constitutionality of the
statute that required him to post a security bond.14 1 His claim was
subsequently dismissed when he failed to do so.142 The California statute
was upheld, and the court held that the provisions of the statute were not
132. 10 FLA. JuR. 2D Constitutional Law § 318 (1997).
133. Martin v. State, 747 So. 2d 386,391-92 (Fla. 2000).
134. Martin v. Cir. Ct., Seventeenth Judicial Cir., 627 So. 2d 1298, 1300 (Fla. 4th
Dist. CL App. 1993).
135. Emery v. Clifford, 721 So. 2d 401, 402 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding
that a prohibition on filing pro se was not a complete denial of access).
136. Siegel, 610 So. 2d at 425 (citing Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9, 15
(Fla. 1974)).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Julie M. Bradlow, Comment, Procedural Due Process Rights of Pro Se Civil
Litigants, 55 U. C. L. REv. 659, 678 (1988).
140. 46 Cal. Rptr. 147 (Cal. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
141. Id. at 147.
142. Id. at 148.
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unreasonable, and that the statute did not discriminate against any roup of
persons unconstitutionally, or deny a litigant due process of law.r43 One
could expect a similar result if Florida's law should be so challenged.
Thus, the FVLL will not violate the constitutional rights of pro se
litigants who come before the court. The statute serves a legitimate
governmental interest in preventing the wheels of justice from becoming so
clogged with frivolous litigation that they cannot effectively provide judicial
remedy for other well-meaning litigants. It does not discriminate unfairly
against those who are without funds, since litigants with legitimate claims
will not be denied access to the courts. Further, alternative means exist,
such as posting the security bond, even if claims are deemed meritless. The
statute does not require the posting of such a bond before filing; it only
requires that a vexatious litigant either obtain leave by telling the judge that
he or she has a new and meritorious claim, or, if brought as a motion during
litigation, that the litigant show the judge at a hearing that his or her claim is
valid. Judicial consideration will be given prior to issuance of an order
requiring a bond. In this manner, the litigant enjoys an opportunity to be
heard, and his or her due process rights are not violated. The bond
requirement is not an absolute bar to litigation; rather, it is an impediment to
those who would otherwise take advantage of the judicial system. The
requirements of the FVLL are narrow enough to protect the courts from
frivolous litigation without infringing upon rights of litigants.
VI. CONCLUSION
The FVLL is a valuable new tool in the hands of Florida courts. It will
make the process of disposing of frivolous claims more efficient and will
ensure that the judicial process runs more smoothly. While there will be
vexatious litigants who challenge the new law and the restrictions it
imposes, the statute as it is currently framed should withstand the pressure. It
will be interesting to see how the FVLL affects vexatious litigants like
Anthony Martin. It may be too soon to tell, but perhaps it really will curtail
the courtroom capers that vexatious pro se litigants exhibit every day in
today's courtrooms.
Deborah L Neveils
143. Id. at 151-52.
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